STUMP ON FORGIVENESS
Richard Swinburne

I claim that all the criticisms made by Eleonore Stump in her Atonement of
my account of the nature and justification of human and divine forgiveness
are entirely mistaken. She claims that God’s forgiveness of our sins is always
immediate and unconditional. I argue that on Christ’s understanding of forgiveness as deeming the sinner not to have wronged one, God’s forgiveness of
us is always conditional on our repenting and being willing to forgive others.
Her account of forgiveness merely as the expression of love for the sinner
leaves her without a separate word for the all-important act of “wiping the
slate clean.” Unlike Stump, I endorse the account in The Letter to the Hebrews
of Christ’s passion and death as a sacrifice for human sin.

Eleonore Stump’s Atonement is a brilliant exposition of a totally new theological interpretation of how the Passion and death of Jesus Christ on the
cross made it possible for humans to be at-one with God. In doing so, she
rejects all other interpretations as seriously deficient. She regards her own
interpretation as a development of the imperfect interpretation provided
by Aquinas; and has strong criticisms of the only other kind of interpretation prevalent in the last thousand years, which is that of Anselm. She
recognizes that my own theory, contained in my book Responsibility and
Atonement, is a version of Anselm’s theory, and claims that it is subject to
most of the criticisms which apply to Anselm’s own version. I argue that
none of her criticisms of Anselm have any force against my version of
Anselm’s theory. I claim in particular that she understands “forgiveness”
in a totally different way from Christ as reported in the Gospels, and that
she fails to bring out the moral importance of “forgiveness” in what I believe to be Christ’s understanding of it.
I
My version of Anselm’s account of human wrongdoing and its consequences is that A wrongs B if and only if A fails to render to B what is due
to him/her, and thereby A acquires guilt; A’s guilt is removed if A makes
atonement to B and in consequence B forgives A. A makes atonement to
B if A repents, apologises to B, makes reparation (that is, compensation
which Anselm calls “satisfaction”) to B and gives to B a little extra as well
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which I call “penance.” In response to such atonement, it is good for B to
“forgive” A. According to Anselm,1 A must make full reparation and penance to B for B to be justified in forgiving A. Stump is however mistaken
in attributing to me this simple view that satisfaction is “a prerequisite for
forgiveness.”2 My view was more nuanced: “Not all [repentance, apology,
reparation, and penance] are needed in every case. For some wrong reparation is inappropriate. . . . But sincere apology [that is, apology resulting
from repentance] is always needed”3; and “in the case of a serious hurt . . .
the wrongdoer must offer some attempt at reparation in so far as it lies
within his power. But the victim may if he chooses let the wrongdoer off
more.”4 According to both Anselm and me, someone else can provide the
reparation for A to offer to B. In my view B has no obligation to forgive
A, even if he has made full atonement to A, although in this case A’s guilt
would eventually disappear.
In applying his account to sin in the sense of wronging God, Anselm
claims that we must indeed repent and apologise to God for our sins; but
since we are unable to make reparation (and penance), God must provide them himself (by becoming incarnate and suffering and dying on the
cross) if it is to be possible for him to forgive us. Aquinas modified this
account by claiming that God could have forgiven us without demanding
“satisfaction,” if he had so chosen; and it would not have been wrong
of him so to choose;5 Aquinas did however hold that it was better that
God should forgive us “by Christ’s passion than by God’s will alone.”6 I
endorsed this Thomist view, on the grounds that by providing us with a
reparation in the form of Christ’s passion which we can offer to God, together with our repentance and apology, as our reparation (and penance)
for our sins, God takes seriously and forces us to take seriously the depth
and extent of human wrongdoing. We make our repentant apology paradigmatically before receiving the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist,
which constitute the application to us of Christ’s Passion and death.
Stump criticises any Anselmian view that forgiveness cannot or should
not be given unless the wrongdoer does something (whether just repenting
and apologizing, or perhaps more than that) which makes forgiveness appropriate. In Stump’s view forgiveness is “an expression of love; and love
is necessary and sufficient for forgiveness.”7 She seems to accept what she
regards as Aquinas’s view that “love is obligatory,”8 and clearly accepts the
view which she finds in Aquinas that there is an unconditional obligation
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on everyone to forgive those who wrong them.9 So, Stump holds—contrary
to Anselm—that as God always loves all humans, he always automatically
forgives them, the moment they sin.
As Stump acknowledges (especially in a subsequent paper10), “forgive”
can be used in more than one sense. But Stump has a preferred sense.
Although (strangely, in view of her major concern with this concept in
a very large book) Stump writes that “it is not part of my purposes here
to define forgiveness,”11 by which she must mean “to define her sense
of forgiveness,” what she writes (cited above) is naturally interpreted as
claiming that in her sense to “forgive” someone who has wronged you is
simply to express love for that wrongdoer. I am happy to agree with her
that it is always good to “forgive” a wrongdoer in her sense of “forgive”
(though I would deny that it is always obligatory). But, I suggest, that is
not the sense in which the Gospel writers used the word ἀϕίημι to report
Christ’s teaching about what is normally described in English as “forgiveness”; and if we wish to understand Christ’s teaching about forgiveness,
we should interpret it as concerned with “forgiveness” in his sense. For
Christ, wrongdoing is depriving someone of something which belongs to
them, be it money, possessions, service, respect, or whatever, and so in a
wide sense incurring an (unauthorized) debt; and forgiving is analogous
to remitting that debt, and so deeming the wrongdoer no longer to owe
anything and so to be in the same position as someone who had never
incurred a debt. Matthew (6:9–13) and Luke (11:2–4) record Jesus teaching
his disciples to say “the Lord’s prayer,” in which we are told to pray “forgive us our” οφειλήματα, “debts” (in Matthew), or ἁμαρτίας, “sins” (in
Luke).12 That is, Christ’s own word (probably in Aramaic) for what we
should forgive was regarded as translatable either as “debts” or “sins.” In
Christ’s parable of the unmerciful servant (Matthew 18:23–35) the servant
who had a large debt remitted by his Lord (after he had asked the Lord for
mercy) tried to extort a small debt owed to him by a fellow servant. When
the Lord heard about this, he handed over the unmerciful servant to be
tortured “until he should pay the entire debt. So my heavenly Father will
also do to every one of you if you do not forgive (ἀφίημι) your brother
or sister from your heart.” So again, sinning is analogous to incurring an
(unauthorised) debt; and forgiving a sinner is analogous to deeming them
to be in the same position as someone who had never incurred a debt. For
this reason I defined B forgiving A as B undertaking that in the future he/
she will not treat A as the originator of an act by which A wronged B;13
forgiving “wipes the slate clean.”
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Other statements of Christ, as quoted in the Gospels, also state or imply
that God will forgive us if and only if certain conditions are satisfied.
There seem to be two such conditions. The first is that we make a sincere
apology, that is show our repentance by apology, or at least show that
we want to do so. Luke 17:3–4 records Christ as teaching that “If another
disciple sins, you must rebuke the offender, and if there is repentance,
you must forgive. And if the same person sins against you seven times
a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent’, you must
forgive.” This seems to imply that if the wrongdoer does not “turn back”
and repent, he need not be forgiven. More explicitly Matthew 18:15–20
represents Christ as teaching that if a church member is judged by the
church, after taking evidence from witnesses, to have sinned, and still
refuses to listen to the church’s rebuke, “let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax-collector.” This clearly implies that we should not “forgive”
those who refuse to repent, in the sense of “forgive” which entails treating
the wrongdoer as though they had not done wrong. The parable of the
two debtors suggests that Christ expects God to deal with us in the way
in which Christ teaches us that he wants us to deal with others; and so
we cannot expect God to forgive us unless we repent and apologise (or at
least show that we want to do so). The second condition for us receiving
divine forgiveness is that we forgive (presumably in response to their repentant apology) those who have wronged us. One only asks for what
one does not already have; in the Lord’s prayer we ask for forgiveness,
and provide as reason why God should forgive us that we are forgiving
others. In the parable of the debtors, the Lord withdrew his forgiveness
when the unmerciful servant did not forgive his fellow servant. And in
Matthew 6:15, Christ comments that if you do not forgive humans their
faults (παραπτώματα), “neither will your heavenly Father forgive your
trespasses.” Christ’s words quoted in Mark 11:25 also emphasise this
condition: “Whenever you stand praying, forgive, if you have anything
against anyone; so that your Father in heaven may also forgive you your
trespasses (παραπτώματα).” Our forgiveness would clearly still need to
be conveyed in words or by our behaviour to the wrongdoer after the
decision, while praying, to give it. The fulfilment of this second condition
thus constitutes our small contribution to reparation for our sins.
As far as I can see, the only discussion in Stump’s book of these Gospel
passages implying that Christ taught that God’s forgiveness of us is not
unconditional is contained in a short note.14 Stump begs the question in
favour of her interpretation in the very first sentence of that note, by describing these passages as “passages that seem to imply that God’s love
and forgiveness are conditional,” and so assuming what she needs to
demonstrate—that forgiveness (in the sense in which the Gospel writers
are interpreting Christ) is simply an inevitable expression of love. She rejects the natural interpretation of Matthew 6:15, on the grounds that on
14
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that interpretation “the saying would be at least in serious tension with
other texts, such as God telling people to love their enemies so that they
will be like God, who sends his good gifts on both the just and the unjust.”
(Matthew 5:45). But in my sense of “forgive” which is what I am claiming
to be Christ’s sense, there is no tension at all. We can still love someone
whom we do not forgive (in my sense), because we respect their wish to be
taken seriously as a person who wants to deprive us of what we think they
owe us, while hoping for and working towards a situation where they will
seek our forgiveness—if necessary, by keeping our distance from them.
And we can also forgive those whom we do not love; people often report
forgiving others for self-centred reasons merely in order to stop feeling
bitter and to “move on” in life. Stump comments on the parable of the two
debtors that “the King (who represents God in the parable) is portrayed as
forgiving his servant first, before the episode in which the serpent failed
to forgive his fellow servant,” and interprets that as showing that God
forgives without conditions. But the king does not forgive the first servant
until the latter asks for some relief of his obligation (in the form of a longer
time in which to repay his debt), and—we may reasonably assume—in so
doing made a repentant apology. And the parable only makes sense if the
King has the right to withdraw his forgiveness of the debt; and that could
only be the case if the King’s forgiveness was given on the assumption that
the debtor intended to show similar forgiveness to those indebted to him.
That assumption proved mistaken, since immediately after his interview
with the king the servant demanded repayment from his fellow servant,
and so the king had the right to withdraw his forgiveness.
The passages in the Gospels which Stump finds as the most illuminating
for our understanding of forgiveness are the parable of the Prodigal Son
and Christ’s words from the Cross, “Father, forgive them; for they do not
know what they are doing” (Luke 23:34). In the parable of the Prodigal son
(Luke 15:11–31) the father gives his younger son his share of his expected
inheritance and the son goes away to a far country and spends it all. Then
the son comes to his senses, wants to go home, prepares words of apology,
and makes the long journey home. His father sees his son returning, “runs
out to meet him . . . , falls on his son’s neck and kisses him” before the son
could make his apology, “I have sinned against heaven and before you.”
I think that Christ (as reported by Luke) means us to understand that the
son is genuinely repentant, and for her purposes in analysing different
theories of forgiveness, Stump also makes that assumption.15 I suspect
that Christ also means us to understand that the father knows that the
son is repentant simply because he sees him coming home, and for her
purposes Stump is willing to make that assumption also. It certainly also
looks as if Christ means us to understand that the father is showing his
forgiveness by putting his arms around the son and kissing him before the
son utters his words of repentance; and, like Stump, I am happy to make
15
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that assumption also. But Stump claims that if we adopt the Anselmian
approach to satisfaction, we cannot interpret the parable in that way; “On
the Anselmian approach, . . . satisfaction is and ought to be a requisite for
forgiveness and reconciliation”;16 the father cannot properly forgive his
son until the son has made satisfaction. But on my version of Anselm’s
theory I denied that that holds universally; everything depends on the
particular case. So we need to be clear about what wrong the son has done.
The father has already given him his share of the inheritance, and is not
proposing to give him any more—as, after the younger son’s return, he
said to the elder son “all that is mine is yours.” The wrong done is to
deprive his father of his company and affection for a significant time and
to lead the father to suppose that he will never see his son again. This is
a serious wrong, and it is plausible to suppose that it would be bad for
the father to forgive the son unless the son had taken some small steps
to make reparation for that wrong. But the son has already made some
steps of a kind appropriate to that wrong—literal steps in making the long
journey home, and asking to stay there permanently; he is now doing his
best to repair the damage, and so the father’s forgiveness is a response to
that attempt. On my version of the Anselmian theory that it is up to the
wronged person to determine how much reparation is enough of a response sufficient to justify full forgiveness, the father is entitled to regard
that response as sufficient to make it good for him to forgive the son.
Stump takes Christ’s words from the Cross as showing that Christ considers that it is good to forgive even when there is no “repentance on the
part of the wrongdoers.”17 But in expounding my Anselmian account I
wrote that my
account of repentance and apology applies in so far as there is an element of
subjectivity in the guilt, in so far as deliberately or through negligence the
wrongdoer has some moral responsibility for doing the harm. If the guilt
is purely objective, arising from the performance of an unintentional act in
performing which there was not even the slightest negligence involved . . .
an apology (but one which brings out the unintentional character of the action) is needed; but it needs behind it no repentance in the form of change
of mind.18

We are not blameworthy for doing actions whose wrong nature we do
not in any way realize; and we can only be blameworthy for not apologising for an unintentional wrong action after we realise that it was a
wrong action. So it is plausible to suppose that God would be right to
forgive those “who do not know not what they are doing,” without that
affecting the main point that God would not be right to forgive those who
do know what they are doing without them repenting and apologising.
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In her subsequent paper,19 Stump has given an example of a case where,
she claims, we cannot interpret Matthew 6:15 as claiming that forgiveness
should not be given without repentance on the part of the wrongdoer.
The example concerns the goodness of forgiving someone who is now
dead and so not capable of apologising. But whatever one thinks that God
expects a living human to do in response to the wrongdoing of someone
now dead (which is a special case which I explicitly discuss in Responsibility and Atonement20) it does not affect the basic point of Christ’s teaching
that God is only going to forgive us if we forgive those whom we are in
a position to forgive when they ask for our forgiveness. I conclude that
Stump’s preferred account of the sense of the Gospel word normally translated as “forgive” is not Christ’s sense, and so will badly mislead those
who take it as a guide to Christ’s teaching on when we should forgive
others and God will forgive us.
II
Further, I argue on independent moral grounds, those who are wronged
and love the wrongdoer should both take the wrongdoer seriously as a
person who wishes to hurt them by depriving them of what is owed to
them, and also show them that it matters very much that they should
repair the wrong done. Those who wrong us are free agents whose attitude towards us ought to be respected and not ignored; and it is good
to help them to see the error of their attitude and the need to repair the
wrong done. Hence those who are wronged should take a different stance
towards the wrongdoer who is unwilling to repent from the stance taken
towards a repentant wrongdoer; and the obvious way to express this point
is to say that it is good not to “forgive” a serious wrong without some sign
of atonement, at least by some sort of repentant apology; but of course
it is good to “forgive” after a degree of atonement, the degree required
being a function of the harm done. To some extent Stump recognises this
point but puts it in different words, when she claims that even though it is
obligatory to “forgive” immediately and without conditions, “grave moral
evil can leave a wrongdoer in such a condition that without some remedy
for a stain on his soul and some way of making sufficient amendments, reconciliation with him is ruled out on moral grounds,” and so it would still
be in place to “require punishment” of someone penitent and forgiven.21
Now certainly on my Anselmian account, just as one can remit a monetary
debt subject to the fulfilment of some condition by the debtor, so too (as
I acknowledged above) one can make one’s forgiveness subject to some
assumption about the wrongdoer’s current intentions. But one can only
“punish” someone if one treats them as someone who has done wrong; and
on my Anselmian account, to forgive someone is to put them in the same
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position as someone who has not done wrong. The kind of “reconciliation”
which Stump acknowledges is good should happen, is, as she pictures it,
a gradual process. So her account seems to leave the great concept of the
wronged person totally and completely “wiping the slate clean,” so that she
deems the wrongdoer not to have wronged her, without a separate word to
describe it when there is already a very suitable word available to describe
it. It is more than “forgiveness plus reconciliation”22 which Stump analyses
as an alternative sense of “forgiveness,” since for her “reconciliation” is
“the union in love of whatever kind of uniting is suitable for persons being
united after being apart.”23 Or rather it is reconciliation of a particular kind.
It is not merely the end of “alienation, and desiring something bad for the
wrongdoer” which Stump associates with reconciliation,24 but consists in
treating the wrongdoer as someone who has not wronged you. Yet so valuable is it in human interaction that this should happen as often as possible,
whenever wrong is done, that Stump’s account just fails to give it the value
which deserves. That is why forgiveness (in what I have argued is Christ’s
sense) of other humans is sometimes so difficult. If I could forgive someone
simply by having the kind of friendly intercourse with them that I had
had previously and wishing them no harm while still bearing in mind the
wrong they had done to me, it wouldn’t be so difficult to forgive them.
According to St Paul’s teaching in the Letter to the Romans, we (that is,
presumably those who have repented and been baptised) have been “justified” by the blood of Christ; in the sight of God we are now “just.” God
gives us this status on the assumption that we intend to behave justly in
future. Given that we do so intend (and God, unlike the King in the parable
of the debtors, will know whether or not we do so intend), this status is
not a provisional one. God has wiped the slate clean. If God sends some
penitent sinners to Purgatory, it cannot be as a “punishment” for their sins,
but only as a means of making their intentions more steadfast, so that they
acquire a character which fits them for heaven.
III
In presenting her own account of the purpose of the Passion of Christ,
Stump has a further criticism of my account of the Atonement. She seems
to reject the view of the Letter to the Hebrews and subsequent Christian
tradition that Christ’s death on the cross constituted a “sacrifice” by Christ
to God. “In the most primitive way of thinking about sacrifice lying behind
Old Testament thought, a sacrifice is the giving of something valuable
to God who consumes it whole (by inhaling the smoke) and often gives
back some of it to be consumed by the worshippers (who eat the roasted
flesh).”25 Stump is right to emphasise that, in Old Testament thought,
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worshippers offer sacrifice for many different reasons apart from seeking
at-onement with God. But it remains the case that offering sacrifice is a
normal way of “making amends to the deity,”26 and the Letter to the Hebrews makes it very clear that by his death Christ “offered for all time
a single sacrifice for sins (ἁμαρτίας” (Hebrews 10:12)—not a verse cited
by Stump). Stump writes: “The sacrifices that are mandated for offences
in the Hebrew Bible are often animal sacrifices. On the idea represented
by Swinburne’s interpretation of sacrifice, something about killing an animal makes an offended God more likely to pardon the offending human
being, or more likely to forgo imposing punishment on the human being
who deserves it.”27 Of course the ancient Hebrews thought that sacrificing
dead animals would be giving to God something valuable. But, as the
Letter to the Hebrews asserted, “it is impossible for the blood of bulls and
goats to take away sins” (Hebrews 10:4). God wants an offering of something really valuable, and that must be something that he does not already
have. As Stump goes on to acknowledge,28 I claimed that what Christ offered was just that—a human life lived perfectly.29 Stump criticises this
account of what Christ offered to God on the ground that in claiming that
Christ’s whole life was a sacrifice, I have made “Christ’s passion and death
seem marginalized or incidental and not central to the present offered to
God, as they need to be on traditional Christian views about Christ as
sacrifice.”30 I don’t think so. Christ was crucified because he lived a perfect
human life by living the life of a wandering rabbi, befriending prostitutes,
tax collectors, and lepers; and telling the rulers and influential people of
his society how they ought to live (including not to respond to force with
force), how sinful they were, and that he was the Messiah sent to tell them
this. The Jewish leaders got him crucified because they resented his words
and actions and feared their effects; and he ended his life living up to his
own teaching by voluntarily not using force to resist force. Being prepared
to die for living a certain kind of life exhibits the maximum degree of
living that kind of life; Christ said “no one has greater love than this, to lay
down one’s life for one’s friends” (John 15:13). Stump finds it “very hard
to understand why the present [of Christ to God] “includes centrally the
suffering and death of an innocent human being.” But if that is a problem,
it is a problem for any account of the Atonement. And Christian tradition
has not regarded it as a problem, because it has seen that that innocent
human being suffering on the cross being God himself, is God’s glory and
triumph, not a disaster. In the words of the Passiontide hymn, “He reigns
from the tree.”
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IV
So I reject all Stump’s criticisms of my version of an Anselmian account
of the Atonement. Her account of forgiveness is not that of the Christ of
the Gospels, and in consequence it does not bring out the importance of
a kind of human interaction vital for human well-being. And it fails to
understand the enormous value of the Passion and death of Christ, constituted by a “sacrifice” in the sense understood in the Letter to the Hebrews.
But my Anselmian account of the Atonement is totally compatible with
Stump’s own account (which I have not discussed), of how Christ acted
to make humans at-one with God, so long as the latter is regarded only
as a way in which God acted, additional to Christ making available his
life and death as a reparation for our sins which we can offer to God, in
consequence of which God treats those who offer it as not having sinned.
Oriel College, Oxford
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